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The Fulbe shaykh and the Bambara "pagans":
contemporary campaigns to spread
Islam in Mali
Benjamin F. SOARES1
This essay looks at a high-profile Fulße Muslim religieus leader from Mali and
explores his relations with the people of the Mande.2 This Muslfm religious leader
or shaykh (Fulfulde, seeku)3, El-Hadj Chcikh Sidy Modibo Kane Diallo4 of Dilly
in the circle of Nara, is perhaps one of the most influential religious leaders in
present day Mali.5 The essay focuses on this man, considered by many to be a
friend of God (wali),6 and examines the devclopment of his "career" as a shaykh
1 The research on which this article is based was generously funded by Fulbright-Hays, the
Wenner-Gren Foundation, USIA/Fulbright and the West African Research Association/Center. I
am grateful to the many people in Mali who provided information for this article, especially El-
Hadj Cheikh Sidy Modibo Kane Diallo (1925-1996), whose recent death deeply saddens me. I
dedicate this article to his memory. I would also like to thank Jane E. Goodman, John Harrelson,
John O. Hunwick, Robert Launay, and Muhammad Sani Umar for their comments and
suggestions,
2 Amselle (1990) argues that thé Ful6e should be included within thé Mande cultural area. I hâve
no objections to this but choose in this discussion to use local ideological constructs about who
is/is not Mande/Fulße.
3 Seeku (from thé Arabie shaykh) is considered higher in rank than a moodibo (pi. moodibaaBe),
another loan word in Fulfulde from thé Arabie, mu'addib, meaning teacher. Moodibo is used to
refer to a broad range of Muslim religious spectalists, including scholars, teachers, and diviners. It
is équivalent in meaning to ceerno (pi. seernaaße) in the Pulaar dialect of Fulfulde spoken in
western Mali and in the Senegal River valley. Like seeku, moodibo can be used as a proper name.
4 Here I follow the orthography used by Sidy himself, for example, on the stamp he puts on his
correspondence in French. In the rest of the essay, I will refer to him as Sidy, as many do.
5 "Chef religieux" (Religious leader) is Sidy's self-appellation m French, found, for example,
painted on his automobiles. Religious leader is also the most satisfactory translation of
seeku/shaykh.
6 Wali is the Arabic word used in Fulfulde (pi. waliyaaoe), I translate wali hère as friend of God
rather than saint to avoid confusion with the latter's Christians referents (cf. Denny 1988, Cruise
O'Brien 1988).
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and a wali."71 show how this career has been constructed in large part through
ideological oppositions between Fulße and Mande/Bambara, as well as through the
shaykh's interactions with actual Bambara people, particularly his efforts to spread
Islam among the country's non-Muslim ("pagan") rural Bambara population and to
eradicate the widespread practice of spirit possession. As I suggest, k is in such
conversion campaigns that one can see most clearly how individuals — both Fulße
and Mande/Bambara — deploy such ideological oppositions. Ultimately, however,
the results of such campaigns to spread Islam remain rather ambiguous.
The sufi: his life and the making of a career
Sidy was born in 1925 into the Kane Diallo family, a Fulße family with a long
and illustrious réputation as learned and pious Muslims.8 Indeed, several members
of the Kane Diallo family have been considered walis.9 And a considérable amount
of the family's prestige comes from the réputations of such celebrated ancestors,
with two of these undoubtedly the most famous. The first, Mohammed Abdoulaye
Souad, came from a toorooddo family, originally from the Matam area of the
Senegal River. He studied with a leading Kunta shaykh in Timbuktu, taking the
Qadiri wird (litany of prayers) from him. He then went on to become the first
prominent shaykh of the sufi order, the Qadiriyya, in the family with many
followers (taalibo, pi. taalibaaße), beginning a tradition of sufism and spiritual
leadership that has continued in the family to the present. After having had very
close ties with the miers of Maasina during Seku Amaadu'syj/zad, Mohammed
Abdoulaye Souad moved out of the orbit of Maasina.10 He died shortly before the
French conquest in the town of Diina in the Bakounou where his tomb is an
important pilgrimage site.
The second of these famous ancestors is Mohammed Abdoulaye Souad's sole
child to live beyond infancy, his daughter, Oumou.11 Although she developed a
réputation as a wali like her father before her, this occurred under considerably
changed circumstances. French colonial rule brought improved transportation and
Communications, as well as new networks of colonial civil servants and soldiers
from throughout the colonies, all of which contributed to the spread of her
réputation and that of her family in the French Sudan and beyond into the other
colonies in French West Africa. Until her death in 1942, countless people made
71 refer here to the "career of sainthood" used by Triaud (1988).
8 I have provided more detail«! biographical information about Sidy and his family elsewhere (see
Soares 1995, cf. Marty 1920).
* Kane is an honorific used among the Toorod&e (sg. loorotfdo) clerisy by those with the pullo
patronym Diallo if they are scholars or members of a scholarly lineage (see Willis 1978). The
Kane Diallo family repons that they are Toorod6e.
10 See Sanankoua (1990) for a discussion of Maasina and ils successive rulers.
1 ' There is considérable discussion of Oumou in the archives, especially after 1941. See Archives
Nationales du Mali, Koulouba (ANM.) 4E-42.4 (Fonds Récents).
appeals to Oumou for petitionary prayers and blessings (duwaawu).12 Soon after
her death, her tomb in Dilly became a major pilgrimage site.13
Dilly is presently home to a large concentration of Kane Diallo family members,
including Sidy, whom Oumou designated from among her grandsons as spiritual
head of thé family. The présence of thé Kane Diallo family with ils réputation gives
thé town a spécial aura. Indeed, Dilly is commonly referred to as thé town of walis
(wuro waliyaaße).14 While not all Kane Diallo family members are considered
walis, many, nonetheless, believe that ail descendants of Mohammed Abdoulaye
Souad hâve baraka (God's favor orblessing).
Although baraka is conceived of as heritable within this family, people
frequently point out that such baraka is something that must also be continually
worked for.15 That is, even within a family as blessed as thé Kane Diallo family,
heredity is not enough. This is precisely what is said about Sidy. In the past few
decades, his réputation has spread throughout Mali, with many active followers or
disciples (taalibaaße) and représentatives (muqaddams) from various ethnie groups,
Bambara, Fulße, Soninke, Moor, etc.16 People stress that his numerous followers
and his tremendous popularity are an index of baraka. That he has worked for
baraka can be seen in his comportaient and in such personal characteristics as his
modesty, generosity, and directness.17
Sidy, being born into a family of walis, has, in a sensé, claimed thé title and
réputation of wali as his birthright. But this does not accurately describe local
understandings. What Sidy has claimed is thé title of shaykh, a title in thé Malian
context that is usually reserved for very few Muslims.18 This claim is announced
on all of his vehicles, where he has painted "El-Hadj Cheikh Sidy Modibo Kane,
chef religieux à Dilly". To his followers, he deserves this title, which is accorded
only to those moodibaaße who enjoy a considérable following.
His réputation for being a wali follows from a différent set of understandings. A
wali never openly proclaims himself as such. As elsewhere in thé Muslim world,
Malian Muslims generally acknowledge that the state of being a wali is conferred by
12 Many Malians are named after Oumou of Dilly. Frequently, childless people make an oath
(Fulfulde, takke; Bambara, dafale) that if they hâve a child, they agrée to name the child Oumou or
Modibo, after her father and her son.
13 This is reported by the French colonial administration as early as 1945. See ANM: lE-104,3
(F.R.), "Rapport de la tournée effectuée par le Commandant, cercle de Nioro, 8-13 nov. 1945,
subdivision de Nara".
14 Dilly is even referred to as thé town of walis in a recently recorded song in Fulfulde about Sidy
by thé Malian singer, Ina Baba Coulibaly.
15 In Dilly, this was also stated by one of Sidy's muqaddams (représentatives) from Jenne over a
loudspeaker at the official opening of thé yearly ziyara (Arabie, visit; Fulfulde, juraade, to visit a
wali) coinciding with thé célébration of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday (Arabie, mawlid al-
nabi) in August 1994.
16 The muqaddams appointed by Sidy number literally in thé hundreds. They are his local
représentatives and are authorized to give people thé Qadiri wird.
11 Similarly, those people who are his followers (taalibaaße) are supposed to work for him as their
shaykh, by performing physical labor or giving gifts of money and kind. In so doing, they are said
to work for baraka.
18 In those areas of Mali (and neighboring Mauritania) where Arabie or Hassaniyya is spoken, the
word shaykh is used more frequently.
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God (Denny 1988). Although one may be a watt without oneself or others being
aware of it, ordinary Muslims may be able to identify a particular watt by certain
signs. One regularly cited sign is the ability to predict unforeseen events. In the case
of Sidy, some of these signs are nis actions or behavior and, especially, his
réputation for being associated with wondrous or astonishing things (Fulfulde
kawde; Bambara, kabako).19
Sidy's réputation for being associated with wondrous things has grown from
countless stories and legends, including some eyewitness accounts detailing things
that have occurred around him, some rather astonishing and others more mundane.
As elsewhere in the Muslim world, people are often predisposed to identify
particular events or happenings around the shaykh as miraculeus (see e.g. Gilsenan
1982). This leads those around him to watch his actions very closely. Additionally,
many of the people in Sidy's entourage tie their own destiny to his. Several people
say that their reasonably good standard of living and health are all because of Sidy,
his baraka, and his closeness to God. These people are the individuals who employ
the term wali the most readily.20 And they are the ones responsible in large part for
spreading his réputation. From the perspective of those Malians who say Sidy and
other contemporary shaykhs are not walis, however, such individuals are just
trying to bolster the réputation of their shaykh.
When asked about the so-called wondrous events identified around him, Sidy is
generally unwilling to discuss them.21 What others call astonishing, hè says, is not
so for him. Rather than discuss these wondrous events, Sidy points to a prédiction
made by his grandmother Oumou. One day, she said, hè would have many
followers around him, and each year the number would increase. By all accounts,
this has come true. Although Sidy never employs the word wali in relation to
himself, hè often uses the term to refer to his ancestors. For those inclined to
believe that hè is a wali and not just a shaykh, the évidence is convincing.
The conversion campaigns among "the Bambara"
Perhaps the single most important factor that has contributed to Sidy's
development of a supra-local réputation is his effort to spread Islam, particularly
19 Muslims learned in Arabic give kawde the gioss karamat in Arabic, which translates loosely as
astonishing things and not as miracles — hence my réticence in using this latter term.
20 To give an idea of some of the things said about Sidy, perhaps to be construed as hyperbolic by
some, I offer the following example. One taalibo that I know who travels regularly with Sidy
praises Sidy publicly in a rather loud voice, calling him "Energy" and saying that hè is like a
motor. The taalibo explained to me that this was because Sidy had power very much like one sees
with electricity. And, furthermore, hè said, when one was around Sidy, all probiems were solved,
and all Üiings worked like a motor.
21 In the interviews and conversations I had with Sidy in the circle of Nioro, April 1994 and
Dilly, August 1994. His family and entourage confirm this unwillingness to talk about these
events. They suggest it is part of his modesty.
among non-Muslims in Mali and elsewhere.22 Although by most accounts
islamization was one of the unintended conséquences of French colonial raie, there
remain to this day areas of Mali with considérable non-Muslim populations.23
Estimâtes of Mali's non-Muslim population range from 20 to 30%. A small
percentage of these non-Muslims are said to be Christians (Brenner 1993:71). It is
among the others — that is, the rural non-Muslims who are not Christians — that
Sidy has concentrated his conversion campaign efforts. Often hè focuses on some
of the same areas covered by the Maasina and Umarian states andjihads associated
with the Fulße as well as areas under the control of Samory in southern Mali.24
Before considering Sidy's campaigns, it is essential to examine the ideas about
the Mande and the Bambara that set the context for Sidy's activities. Amselle has
pointed to the existence in ethnological writings of an opposition between Bambara
and Muslim, where Bambara are seen as both pagan or non-Muslim and
autochthonous (1990: 80). This opposition can also be seen in local ideological
constructs, where Muslim is often equated with Fula (in the Bambara language) or
Fulße/Futanke, who are sometimes seen as foreigners or invaders.25
This opposition between non-Muslim Bambara and Muslim Fulße can be
directly related to another opposition between bamanaya and silameya in the
Bambara language, as described by Bazin for both pre-colonial Mali and, to some
extent, the contemporary situation (1985: 121 f.). Bamanaya refers to what can be
considered the expert knowledge of the Bambara, or those magico-religious
practices involving, among other things, blood sacrifices and the manipulation of
religious objects or power objects.26 Such expert knowledge also includes
"traditional" medicine, often derived from plants (cf. Bazin 1985). Silameya, on the
other hand, is the knowledge of Islam, that is, the expert knowledge of Muslim
religious specialists, including petitionary prayers, blessings, alms-giving, and
amulet confection.
As Bazin points out, these two Systems of knowledge have often been rivalrous.
Indeed, Muslims in Mali frequently criticize "the Bambara" for engaging in
practices deemed non-Islamic and/or for being unbelievers. Fulße Muslims,
including many in Sidy's entourage, often point to anndal Bamarankooße, literally
the expert knowledge of the Bambara, as the source of their transgression.27
Among the many things for which "the Bambara" are criticized is the use of power
22 Somewhat similar conversion campaigns in Northern Nigeria are discussed by Paden (1986).
23 On the expansion of Islam during the colonial period, see Harmon (1988). On French colonial
policies toward Islam and Muslims, see Harrison (1988).
24 The literature on these jihads and states is vast. The most important monographs include
Robinson (1985) for the Umarian jihad, Sanankoua (1990) for Maasina, Person (1968-75) for
Samory, and Roberts (1987) for a history of the successive states of the Middle Niger.
25 This is especially thé case for thé Futanke. See Hargreaves (1966) and Robinson (1985). In
other contexts in Mali, Muslim gets identified with Soninke, Dyula, Moor, etc. Bambara,
however, often remains equated with non-Muslim.
26 Such objects are called basi and boli in Bambara, thé so-called fetishes in English. Sidy's
entourage frequently uses thé Bambara word, boli. The term "power objects" is used by Bazin
(1985) andMcNaughton (1988).
27 They also mention anndal balewal (literally, black knowledge), illicit non-Muslim
knowledge/practice among thé Ful&e, though much less frequently than anndal Bamarankooße.
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objects, and particularly the practice of "treating these objects as gods" — a rather
serious charge from a Muslim perspective. But, at the same time, it is important to
note that not all the "knowledge of the Bambara" is considered illicit by the people
making such critiques. Many people who consider themselves pious Muslims
frequently use "traditional" medicines made by the same experts in bamanaya, all
the while vilifying their other practices.
Drawing on Bazin's analysis, Brenner has recently argued that Muslim religieus
leaders or experts in silameya have been marginalized in Mali in recent years
because of "development" ideology, which has ils own coterie of experts, who
view "development" as the panacea for all problems (1993: 77f.). While this is
certainly occurring, Muslim religious leaders still have an important place in the
society, especially in those rural areas where development ideology has made less
of a direct impact. As I have argued elsewhere (Soares 1995), it seems that
religious authority has in part become personalized in figures like Sidy.28 So
despite marginalization of the expert knowledge Muslim religious leaders are said to
possess, a shaykh with a réputation like Sidy's is able to operate supra-locally.
As noted above, Sidy's widespread réputation as a religious leader rests in large
part on his efforts to spread Islam, that is, in those areas seen as "Bambara" or non-
Muslim/pagan that were the targets of the jihadists in the pre-colonial period. He
launched his first conversion campaign during the colonial period, in 1944, when
hè visited a group of nine Bambara villages in the Segou area (Kane Diallo n.d.). It
was not until the 1980s that hè organized several large-scale trips — sometimes
lasting for months on end — during which hè encouraged people to give up their
indigenous religious practices and to embrace Islam (Kane Diallo n.d.). Major
campaigns have been undertaken in the Kaarta, Beledougou, the area around
Sikasso, as well as in Côte d'Ivoire, among other places.
Sidy and his entourage emphasize that his efforts to spread Islam have always
been peaceable. In fact, hè agrées to enter only those villages to which hè has been
invited by the village chief. Such initial invitations, however, often come from
younger people, who have been involved in the migration process as laborers or
traders elsewhere in Mali or further afleid.
There is a long tradition of Malians, predominantly though not exclusively
young males, migrating seasonally. During the colonial era, many were seasonal
migrants to the peanut basins in the Senegambia while others labored or traded in,
or, to and from other neighboring French or British colonies, returning to their
home areas for the agricultural season. More recently, vast numbers of Malians,
often propelled by drought, have gone as migrant laborers to southern towns in
Mali, to more prosperous countries such as Côte d'Ivoire or to Central Africa, not
to mention the long term Malian, and especially Soninke, migration to France.
Much of this migration, although now less seasonal in nature, is by people who
continue to maintain ties with rural-based kin.
In the course of lengthy stays within the larger political economy, migrants from
28 There are indeed several marabouts in Mali who like Sidy have a national réputation and, in
some cases, réputations that extend into neighboring countries such as Mauritania, Senegal,
Burkina, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea. See Launay ( 1992) for a discussion of Muslim scholars with
national réputations in Côte d'Ivoire.
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different areas are exposed to their fellow workers' conceptions of Islam which
may differ from what they are familiär with.29 Islam has become a unifying element
for migrants, especially in places such as Côte d'Ivoire where Muslims constitute a
minority.30 This seems to be the case even for those from areas without a long
history of islamization. In many cases, migrants are exposed to a standardized or
normative model of Islamic practice in which sufi leaders are valued highly as
intermediaries between people and God (cf. Launay 1992) and "traditional"
religious practices are denigrated (Hefner 1993).
A fair number of migrants return to their villages after travel, work, and capital
accumulation, bringing new ideas with them. And some, with their new-found
political economie power, are able to challenge local people and their practices.
Some of thé migrants, who may hâve met thé celebrated shaykh on his extensive
trips or heard about his réputation, sélect him as thé agent of change. They invite
him to rid their villages of religious objects and practices — "fetishes" and spirit
possession — which they now find objectionable. What this usually amounts to is a
generational conflict. After having accumulated resources as migrants, members of
thé younger génération are able to take the upper hand. Instead of deferring to their
elders, migrants appeal to external sources of power and authority which, in this
case, are thé sufi shaykh and Islam.
In conversations with Sidy, he always referred to those villages in which he has
conducted conversion campaigns as "Bambara".31 He claims that he does not force
people to convert to Islam. After he has been informed that people in a particular
village are not Muslims, he then contacts thé village chief to say that he has heard
that this is thé case. He tells them that they should convert to Islam and then asks
whether they are ready to convert. If thé village chief agrées to allo w him to visit thé
village, he travels to thé village with his sizeable entourage and exhorts villagers to
embrace Islam. In many such "Bambara" villages, numerous people — sometimes
whole villages — are reported to hâve converted to Islam following Sidy's visit.
During a village conversion campaign, Sidy teaches thé shahada (thé Muslim
profession of faith) and thé obligatory prayers. A member.of Sidy's entourage
shaves thé heads of those adult men who undergo conversion. And people are
given Muslim names. Villagers are also told to give up their religious objects to
members of Sidy's entourage who count and then burn them outside of the village.
As one member of Sidy's entourage explained, people are usually very reluctant to
give up their religious objects, often saying that thé objects contain some prized
ingrédient "from thé Mande".32 Others report that people are also very frightened of
thé potentially dangerous conséquences of relinquishing such objects and allowing
29 Thèse différent conceptions include sufism and thé anti-sufism of Wahhabis. Many migrants
hâve, of course, been influenced by Wahhabi ideas. On thé Wahhabis, thé Wahhabiyya or Ahl al-
Sunna and "reformist Islam" in Mali, see Amselle ( 1985), Brenner (1993), Kaba (1974) and Niezen
(1990).
30 The classic text dealing with such issues is Cohen's (1969) study of Hausa migrants in western
Nigeria.
31 Although Sidy does have Bambara muqaddams, the most prominent of them are not Bambara.
32 Those who collect the power objects on behalf of Sidy described their initial trépidation in
doing so. It was explained that Sidy's being a wali and his spécial petitionary prayers assured that
thé collection of objects would pass without incident.
f
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them to be destroyed. Villagers almost never agrée to watch the burning of the
objects.
Before leaving a village, Sidy sélects someone frora his entourage to rernain
behind in order to act as prayer leader and to teach the Koran. Kane Diallo family
records list nearly 175 villages in Mali in which villagers relinquished tens of
thousands of power objects, and nearly 300 mosques that were constructed under
Sidy's initiative.33
When Sidy visits a village where Islam is already fairly well established, hè
urges people to give up those customs (aada)3* that hè says conflict with Islam.
Most notably, hè has campaigned against spirit possession cuits (Fulfulde,
moonaankooße; Bambara, jine-don),35 which, according to members of Sidy's
entourage, are found almost exclusively among those who already profess to be
Muslims.36 The campaigns against spirit possession are concurrent with the
campaigns to spread Islam and have received nearly as much attention. Most of
those involved with spirit possession in the areas of his campaigns are women, and
membership is ethnically diverse. Sidy contends that being a Muslim is not
compatible with spirit possession. One of the major objections is the blood
sacrifices it involves, as in bamanaya. Such blood is often used in the confection of
amulets, a practice which, people explain, is strictly forbidden according to the
precepts of Islam. Another related criticism is that those involved in spirit
possession treat what they do as a religion (diind), as in bamanaya, when the only
true religion is supposed to be Islam. These kinds of objections lead many,
including some in Sidy's family, to go so far as to say that even though those
involved in spirit possession might pray and fast like Muslims, they are actually
unbelievers.
Jn his village-based campaigns against spirit possession, Sidy generally invites
people to give up such practices. When those involved in spirit possession corne to
see him, ostensibly to renounce their practices, hè usually places one of his hands
on each woman's head — purported to chase the spirits away.37 Kane Diallo family
records list about 200 villages that Sidy visited where people, mostly women, have
given up spirit possession. In one village, people did not immediately reveal the
existence of organized spirit possession cuits in the village during a visit by Sidy.
Shortly before his departure, someone informed him, and hè proceeded to give a
33 List of villages visited by Sidy Modibo Kane Diallo in the present author's possession.
34 From the Arabic, 'adat.
35 Cultural bias against spirit possession is reflected in the most common word used by the FulSe
to refer to it. This word, moonaankooße, has the same root as moonaade, which means to feign an
illness. See DNAFLA (1993).
3<> For recent studies of spirit possession in Mali, see Gibbal (1982, 1994). Conflicts between
Muslims and those involved in spirit possession have been discussed by Masquelier (1993) and
Stoller (1989) for neighboring Niger.
371 was not present for any such sessions, although Sidy's entourage played me an audio cassette
which recorded some such sessions in which violent screaming could be heard. They explained that
these were women spirit mediums whom Sidy was touching. The screams were said to be the
sounds of the spirits hè was driving away.
As far as Sidy placing his hand on the heads of spirit possession cuit members, this would be
consonant with cult members' conceptions of spirits and their relationship to the human body.
Spirit possession adepts in Nioro du Sahel claimed that spirits do réside in the head of the medium.
short sermon about the incompatibility of Islam and spirit possession.
If one considère that spirit possession is almost always identified with women
(cf. Gibbal 1982), Sidy's campaigns can be seen as an assault on some women's
sources of power and authority. In a way, such campaigns against non-Muslim
Bambara and spirit possession amount to campaigns against those who are
relatively socially and politically marginal, with little power and authority beyond
their immédiate local areas (cf. Stoller 1989). The two campaigns — against non-
Muslims and against spirit possession — are linked in a way that perhaps escapes
the notice of Sidy and his entourage. Even though those involved with spirit
possession profess to be Muslims, they usually maintain close ties with non-
Muslim Bambara doma (healer, sorcerer), almost always keeping such an expert on
hand at ceremonies or summoning one for consultation in proper bamanaya or
medico-religious practices.
The local opposition and its routing
Why do people relinquish their religious objects to Sidy and/or give up their
cherished practices? Part of the answer seems to be the sheer force of Sidy's
personality and his charisma. For instance, many believe that association with such
a shaykh or wali bestows blessings. Others hold that because hè is close to God, hè
is able to gain God's favor. Concretely, this translates into all those things people
want, including children, wealth, good health, and social prestige. Moreover,
Muslims and non-Muslims alike are generally afraid of important religious leaders
as well as anyone with a measure of power (cf. Bagayogo 1987). Sidy, with his
numerous followers and national réputation, is clearly taken to be someone with a
considérable amount of power.
The case can be made, however, that people give up their religious practices and
objects because these things are contested or questioned on a genera! level. First,
such objects and/or practices have arguably lost much of their value in the twentieth
Century. The colonial conquest reshaped the region's political economy and
prepared the terrain for the widespread islamization that ensued. This was followed
by the state-sanctioned expansion of Western-inspired ideas and practices relating to
"development", health, and technology, especially in the post-independence period.
Although the Malian state has encroached more on local sources of authority, it has
remained unable to permeate fully the rural landscape. While bamanaya has been
marginalized on a national scale, its practitioners have been isolated in small rural
pockets. Even though the broader market for such non-Muslim objects has
contracted, they remain important in certain realms of everyday expérience,
particularly in the areas of health and healing. Indigenous non-Muslim sources of
power, although not completely marginalized, have been pushed into the private
sphère, with individuals making use of them as needed.38 Moreover, it is difficult
38 This does not preclude the clandestine use of those things anchored in bamanaya deemed illicit.
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to envision such non-Muslim sources of power becoming the basis for trans-local
authority in quite the same way, for example, that Islam has, since the end of the
colonial period.
Second, while religieus objects deemed non-Islamic might remain relevant in
localized géographie areas and in private realms, they have been overshadowed by
national if not transnational sources of power, authority, and legitimacy. Despite its
stated commitment to secularism, the Malian state increasingly adopted the signs of
Islam during the 1980s, under the regime of Moussa Traoré (Brenner 1993).
Although the relationship between the state and this religious leader is not
unambiguous, the state and its représentatives in thé civil service have been very
accommodating to him and his conversion campaigns (Soares 1995). The state has
always provided him with administrative authorization for his campaigns, thereby
lending legitimacy to them. Moreover, his rural trips are always facilitated by
government représentatives who greet his visits with much fanfare. And many
government représentatives publicly and semi-publicly solicit him for blessings or
petitionary prayers and give him lavish gifts in return, thereby reinforcing — if not
boosting — his power and authority. Regardless of intentions, each side benefits
from association with thé other.
While Sidy and his entourage présent a triumphalist view of their campaigns
which describes thé inévitable march toward Islam, local opposition does exist to
his efforts to spread Islam and to eliminate practices deemed non-Islamic. In a
number of instances he has encountered some overt opposition. For example, one
non-Muslim Bambara soma (healer, sorcerer or diviner) notified Sidy that any
attempt to visit his village would be tantamount to war. No visit was made to this
village and some others known for résistance to jihad in thé nineteenth Century.
Opposition by entire villages seems to be isolated. But when asked about such
opposition, Sidy and his entourage stress that they go only to villages from which
they hâve received invitations. Those who do not convert right away, Sidy
explained to me, will do so eventually.
While it is difficult to corroborate thé reports of abandonment of spirit
possession and handing over of religious objects, such "conversion" may in some
cases be rather unlike what Sidy and his entourage hâve in mind. It appears that
they hâve returned to some villages to find that people have taken up again the use
of objects that they had relinquished on earlier visits.39 In discussing thé
campaigns, Sidy's entourage stresses that those villages that hâve experienced
calamities such as drought will see better times once they embrace Islam. While
villagers targeted in thé campaigns are perhaps initially swayed by such assurances
to relinquish their religious objects, thé departure of Sidy and his représentatives
may leave a void that people then fill with what is familiär. Although local people,
when faced with thé shaykh, are afraid to refuse to relinquish their objects, many
are in thé end unwilling or unable to live without such objects. In at least one
village, the village's main proprietor of power objects did not give these up during a
There is of course constant spéculation about this possibility in Mali.
39 Informai conversations m Dilly, August and December 1994. Robert Launay (personal
communication) informs me that campaigns to destroy "fetishes" were not unknown in Côte
d'Ivoire during the colonial period. Their influence was also temporary.
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visit by Sidy. Either the other villagers did not betray their existence to Sidy's
entourage or the latter ignored their existence. Such omissions and/or oversights, of
course, do not get woven into thé celebratory narratives about thé campaigns.
Similarly, in some villages, women involved in spirit possession are known to
hâve fled so as not to be present during Sidy's visits. Other women hâve used
dissimulation to avoid renunciation of spirit possession. One of the most renowned
spirit mediums in the Kaarta organized a group of women to chant the shahada (the
Muslim profession of faith) as Sidy arrived for a visit to her village. Such chanting
is considered a pious act and would be deemed most appropriate around a Muslim
religious leader of Sidy's stature. Sidy had heard much about this woman and her
alleged non-Islamic practices. But when he met the woman to ask her about her
involvement with spirit possession, she denied doing anything illicit or forbidden
by Islam. His reply to her was that the matter was between her and God.
Taken together, all of these local responses, if not constituting outright
résistance by the weak and oppressed (Scott 1985, cf. Abu-Lughod 1990), are real
though fairly diffuse forms of opposition. Ultimately, thé form of local opposition
is muted by thé very conditions of thé conversion campaigns — thé shaykh's
réputation, thé new political economie power of migrants, and the state.
The shaykh's réputation ascendant
Opposition also exists, not against Sidy's campaigns, but against Sidy as a
religious leader. Less local in form, this opposition cornes mainly from three
groups of people: a small group of urban secularists; Muslim religious leaders from
other sufi orders and their followers, who resent Sidy's popularity and influence;
and those associated with thé Wahhabiyya or Ahl aï-Sunna, who are critica! of sufis
and sufism.40 Interestingly enough, each of thé groups is united in their disdain for
those things that Sidy campaigns against, indigenous rural practices and spirit
possession, with thé resuit that this potential opposition is muted as well.
The Wahhabiyya or Ahl aï-Sunna are on principle opposed to sufis and their
practices, which would include Sidy and the Qadiriyya, the sufi order of which he
is a recognized leader. Sidy and his entourage are, in turn, very actively opposed to
Wahhabi ideas and influence.41 But Sidy's campaigns to spread Islam among non-
Muslims and to eliminate spirit possession are projects that thé Wahhabis cannot
help but approve. Giving up what is seen as incompatible with Islam is exactly
what thé Wahhabis continually talk about. When asked about Sidy's activities,
Wahhabis laud his efforts to spread Islam, though without failing to criticize his
practice of sufism. Paradoxically enough, respect for Sidy even extends to those
who are potentially his most vociferous critics.
4® See Brenner (1993) for a discussion of Malian secularists.
41 Sidy and his entourage note that thé Wahhabis have made no inroads near Dilly, unlike other
places in rural Mali.
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In spite of opposition, it is nonetheless clear that Sidy's widespread réputation
rests firmly on these conversion campaigns among non-Muslims, regardless of
their real outcomes. Throughout Mali, Muslims, including many of those affiliated
with other sufi orders, repeatedly praise him for the way in which hè is said to have
spread Islam. Moreover, hè is always singled out as exceptional among Malian
shaykhs for doing so much for Islam, as some people describe it. Many note that
Sidy's actions distinguish him from some of Mali's other widely known religious
leaders, who are interested more in material gain than in the hereafter.
For some Malian Muslims, the purported success of Sidy's efforts is one of the
proofs or signs that hè is indeed a wali. The conversion campaigns are thus
interpreted as yet another wondrous phenomenon associated with him. Many
Muslims, favorably disposed to Sidy or not, assert that not just anyone can disarm
those engaged in non-Islamic religious practices. They often point out that it was
necessary in the past to resort to armed struggle, as in the nineteenth Century jihads,
to compel people to give up such practices and objects.
In the present, as is often repeated, Sidy avoids confrontation in his campaigns
to spread Islam. He asks people to accept his recommendations to embrace Islam,
and they do so. The attempts of the Fulße shaykh to convert Mande or Bambara
"pagans" are not, however, to be seen simply as the move of an alien ethnie or
religious leader into an indigenous Mande/Bambara context. Individuals in both
groups are able to manipulate the situation to their advantage by using the
ideological catégories and oppositions: Mande/Bambara, Fulße; Muslim, non-
Muslim. The Bambara migrants use the Fulße shaykh to intervene in their rural
villages. Sidy, in turn, relies upon the rural Bambara "pagans" for the making of
his career as a shaykh and a wali. Indeed, his "success" of working to bring Islam
to "the Bambara" has been the central element in the making of his widespread
réputation. While the progress of Islam is not readily observable in quite the terms
the shaykh and his entourage use, this is in some ways irrelevant to the making of
this career, premised as it is on such ideological oppositions.
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Résumé
Cet article décrit un chef religieux musulman peul, parmi les plus influents du
Mali contemporain. Il montre comment sa carrière s'est construite en grande mesure
en fonction des oppositions idéologiques entre Peuls et Mandingues/Bambaras.
Cette étude analyse ses campagnes pour répandre l'islam parmi la population rurale
non musulmane dite « bambara » ainsi que celles contre les cultes de possession.
Ces campagnes illustrent la façon dont les individus, aussi bien Peuls que
Mandingues/Bambaras, utilisent de telles oppositions idéologiques. Pourtant,
l'efficacité à long terme de tels entreprises demeure incertaine.
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